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Abstract
This thesis submits a hypothesis that smartphone accelerometers possess unique
fingerprints. We believe that the fingerprints arise from hardware imperfections during the sensor manufacturing process, causing every sensor chip to respond differently
to the same motion stimulus. The differences in responses are subtle enough that
they do not affect most of the higher level functions computed on them. Nonetheless,
upon close inspection, these fingerprints emerge with consistency, and can even be
somewhat independent of the stimulus that generates them. Measurements and classification on 80 standalone accelerometer chips, 25 Android phones, and 2 tablets,
show precision and recall upward of 96%, along with good robustness to real-world
conditions. Unsurprisingly, such sensor fingerprints invite new threats in smartphone
applications. A crowd-sourcing app running in the cloud could segregate sensor data
for each device, making it easy to track a user over space and time. This thesis
makes the case that such attacks are almost trivial to launch, while simple solutions
may not be adequate to counteract them.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Inspired by past work on device fingerprinting [29, 44, 51], where WiFi chipsets were
shown to exhibit unique clock skews and frequency offsets, we asked the question:
could sensors in today’s smartphones also have unique fingerprints? In the pursuit of
this question, we gathered, over time, around 80 standalone accelerometer chips used
in popular smartphones, subjected each of them to vibrations from a single vibration
motor (common in today’s phones), and experimented with the large volume of
motion data received from each of them. We found that while high level operations
on the accelerometer signals yielded similar results, e.g., all the chips were comparable
in counting the number of walking steps, an appropriately designed high dimensional
feature-vector exhibited strong diversity, a fingerprint.
Our initial skepticism that this fingerprint is an outcome of non-identical vibrations was dispelled when a given accelerometer repeatedly exhibited the same distinct pattern. Moreover, we found that the fingerprints persist even if the vibrations
are subjected in less controlled settings, e.g., when the user is naturally holding an
accelerometer-equipped phone. Even different phone cases made of rubber or plastic
did not affect much, so long as the system was trained on those casings. Finally, our
attempts to scrub off the fingerprint (without affecting the high level functions such
as step-count) did not meet immediate success. Inducing small amounts of noise in
the accelerometer signal still preserved the fingerprint; adding too much noise af-
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Figure 1.1: Example threat: Bob uses traffic and health apps, supported by the same
cloud backend. Even when device IDs are blocked, exporting a slice of sensor data
enables the cloud to infer that it is the same user.
fected the activity and gesture recognition applications. This thesis reports on our
effort to verify the existence of accelerometer fingerprints, and draws attention to
new kinds of threats that may arise as a consequence.
Figure 1.1 illustrates one possible threat. Consider a common scenario where
multiple motion-sensing apps, such as a road traffic estimator, a calorie counter, a
gesture-based gaming app, etc., all use a common backend service. To prevent the
backend from aggregating and indexing data per individual, a “cookie law” has been
enforced in the US and Europe [39] requiring apps to obtain user-permission before
uploading cookies or any other identifiers to the cloud. Interestingly, research [22]
shows that stealing of various IDs, such as the IMEI (device ID), IMSI (subscriber
ID), or ICC-ID (SIM card serial number), is still rampant in apps. While a recent
proposal [21] has designed solutions to thwart ID-theft, we observe that sensor data
is not entitled to scrutiny since they are legitimately required by apps. If the sensor
data indeed exhibits a fingerprint, the backend can easily bypass the law, and index
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the data by these fingerprints.
Put differently, an accelerometer fingerprint can serve as an electronic cookie,
empowering an adversary to consolidate data per user, and track them over space
and time. Alarmingly, such a cookie is hard to erase, unless the accelerometer wears
out to the degree that its fingerprint becomes inconsistent. We have not noticed any
evidence of this in the 9 months of experimentation with 107 accelerometers.
The notion that sensors can offer side-channel information is obviously not new.
Past work has demonstrated how accelerometers can leak information in smartphones
– for instance, from accelerometer data gathered during typing, authors in [13,14,34]
have shown that the typed characters, such as PIN numbers, can be inferred. Even
swiping motion patterns can be estimated [8]. While disabling the accelerometer
during a sensitive operation (e.g., typing PINs) is a plausible solution, the same does
not apply in our case because even a small slice of the sensor reading is adequate to
extract the fingerprint. Another alternative could be to perform the computations
locally on the phone and only send the higher level results to the cloud. However,
some operations are far too CPU-heavy to be performed on-phone, while others
require matching against large databases that are expensive to download to the
phone. Pre-processing the signals and scrubbing off the fingerprint is probably the
appropriate approach, however, as we find later, this requires deeper investigation in
the future. Scrubbing the signal without an understanding of the app is risky – an
app that needs high fidelity signals could easily be affected upon over-scrubbing.
A natural question on sensor fingerprints pertains to scalability, i.e., is the fingerprint unique against millions of sensors? We admittedly have no proof of such
large scale, neither a theoretical basis to justify our claim. We have only attempted
to lease/gather as many devices as possible, amounting to: (1) 80 stand-alone ac-
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celerometer chips of three types (used in the latest smartphones and tablets, including
the Samsung Galaxy S III and Kindle Fire). (2) 25 Android phones composed of a
mix of Samsung S3, Galaxy Nexus, and Nexus S. (3) 2 Samsung tablets. Each of the
standalone chips were plugged into the same customized circuit board connected to
an external vibration motor to provide the motion stimulus. As a result, the recorded
accelerometer readings are free of any potential effects caused by the OS version and
the middleware of smartphones. The Android phones and tablets were used as is;
the stimulus induced by programming its on-board vibration motor.
The sensor fingerprint is designed as a vector of 36 features drawn from the time
and frequency domain of accelerometer signals. A Bagged Decision Tree [16] is used
for ensemble learning and classification (detailed later). Results show that among
these sensors, classification precision and recall reach upwards of 96%. Moreover, the
fingerprints proved to be robust, visible even through natural hand-held positions,
and even for various casings, including one of soft rubber. While more extensive
evaluation is warranted to verify the hypothesis (perhaps in an actual manufacturing pipeline), we believe that our results are still valuable. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the earliest work that suggests and verifies (in a lab setting) that
accelerometers in modern smartphones are identifiable. We call the overall system,
AccelPrint.
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Chapter 2
Accelerometers: A Closer Look
This section presents a brief background on accelerometers to qualitatively reason
about the source of fingerprints. Then, we describe our experiment framework and
present early evidence of accelerometer fingerprints. Detailed results and numerous
associated issues are presented in the evaluation section.

Hardware Imperfections
Accelerometers in smartphones are based on Micro Electro Mechanical Systems
(MEMS) that emulate the mechanical parts through micro-machining technology [7].
Figure 2.1 shows the basic structure of an accelerometer chip, composed of several
pairs of fixed electrodes and a movable seismic mass. The distances d1 and d2 represent the small gaps that vary due to acceleration and form a differential capacitor
pair. The chip measures the acceleration according to the values of these differential
capacitor pairs. It is the lack of precision in this electro-mechanical structure that
introduces subtle idiosyncrasies in different accelerometer chips. Even slight gaps between the structural parts (introduced during the manufacturing process) can change
the capacitance [7]. Moreover accelerometer chips use Quad Flat Non-leaded (QFN)
or Land Grid Array (LGA) packaging, another potential source of imperfections [18].
According to the official data sheets, the target applications for smartphone accelerometers are gesture recognition, display rotation, motion-enabled games, fitness
5

Accelerometer Chip

Anchor
Fixed
Electrodes
Movable
Seismic
Mass

Tether
(spring)
Differential
Capacitor Pair

d1 d2

C1

Structure of MEMS
Accelerometer

• d1 = d 2
• C1 = C2

C2

(No Acceleration)

d1 d2

C1

• d1 ≠ d 2
• C1 ≠ C2

C2

(Under Acceleration)

Figure 2.1: The internal architecture of MEMS accelerometer chip used in smartphones.

monitoring, etc. These applications primarily depend on the relative change in the
accelerometer readings as opposed to their absolute values. Therefore, while subtle imperfections in the accelerometer chips can lead to different acceleration values,
they may not affect the rated performance of the target applications. However, these
discrepancies may be sufficient to discriminate between them.

Evidence of Fingerprints
To gain early evidence on the existence of fingerprints, we conducted an experiment
using 6 stand-alone accelerometer chips of 3 types: (i) MPU-6050; (ii) ADXL-345;
and (iii) MMA-8452q. MPU-6050 is a MEMS chip [5] used in many mobile devices,
including the Galaxy S III and Kindle Fire. The ADXL-345 is a small, thin, ultra-low
power 3-axis accelerometer [1] with a high resolution of 13 bits and scaling up to ±16g
(where g is acceleration due to gravity). This is mainly used for tap/swipe sensing
and activity recognition. MMA-8452q is a 12 bit digital 3-axis low-power capacitive
accelerometer [4], available in QFN packaging, and configurable to ±2g/±4g/±8g
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Figure 2.2: Accelerometer responses of 6 chips for the same stimulation: (a) Using
Root Sum Square (RSS) of the three axes over time offers some differentiation among
chips; (b) Clustering on 2 dimensions – RSS mean and deviation – improves separation; (c) Clusters that overlap with mean/deviation, separate out further using a
Skewness feature.
through high-pass filters. The mix of chips included in the experiment are three
MPU-6050 from two different vendors (SparkFun and Amazon), two ADXL-345, and
one MMA-8452q. We setup the Arduino Uno R3 boards [2] to collect accelerometer
readings from the chips. We use an external vibration motor – the model used in
most smartphones – to stimulate the accelerometer with a specific vibration dutycycle, controlled through the Arduino board. Figure 2.3 shows the experimental
setup.
Each of the six stand-alone chips are stimulated with an identical vibration sequence and their accelerometer readings are recorded. Figure 2.2a shows the root
sum square (RSS) of the three axes values against time. The plots on each column
are distinct but the elements in the top two rows look similar. To separate them
7

Figure 2.3: Experimental setup with the Arduino board on the left, the red accelerometer chip on the breadboard, and the vibration motor connected over the
wire.
out, Figure 2.2b plots the mean RSS values against their standard deviations (i.e.,
in a 2-dimensional plane). Each experiment on a chip yields a data point on the
graph and the points from multiple experiments on the same chip exhibits a cluster.
The top two rows that appear similar in Figure 2.2a begin to separate out on this
2-dimensional plane, although some overlap still remains. Of course, other features
might be more effective in reducing the overlap.
As an example, consider a feature called skewness, which measures the asymmetry
of a probability distribution. Figure 2.2c shows the skewness of the accelerometer
readings of the two similar MPU-6050 chips (tagged “C” and “D”). Evidently, one
consistently shows a higher skewness over the other even though they are the same
make and model. This suggests that chips that appear indistinguishable on one
dimension may be well separated on others. Recruiting an appropriate set of feature
vectors and projecting the accelerometer signals on them may demonstrate that
accelerometers could indeed be unique.
An accelerometer fingerprint (under controlled vibration sequences) may not necessarily translate to a smartphone fingerprint in the real world. First, the OS running
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on the phone, application API, and CPU load, can all influence the sensor readings.
Second, considering that fingerprinting is based on subtle features in response to brief
vibrations, the surface on which the device is placed, or its casing, may also matter. While these make fingerprinting a naturally-used smartphone more challenging
compared to a standalone accelerometer, we observe that additional sensors on the
phone could be harnessed as well. A gyroscope, barometer, and accelerometer may
together exhibit a fingerprint robust to OS versions, CPU-load, and surfaces. While
we leave this exploration to future work, in this thesis we show that accelerometers
alone can achieve reasonable smartphone fingerprinting under uncontrolled conditions. Naturally, this makes the threats imminent.
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Chapter 3
Threat Model
We consider an adversary that aims to identify smartphones but cannot gain access
to unique device IDs (e.g., IMEI or ICC-ID). This can be because these IDs are
protected by monitoring strategies [21, 22]. Thus, the adversary attempts to obtain
fingerprints of in-built sensors (in this thesis, we focus only on accelerometers, and
leave other sensors to future work).

Access Mechanisms
We assume that the adversary is able to accomplish the needful to access accelerometer data (discussed next), and can communicate over networks.
Smartphone Access. We assume that an adversary can access apps that are
either installed legitimately by a user or affected by malware. In either case, the
adversary can interact with the smartphone through the apps over the communication networks. For instance, an adversary could be an advertiser (e.g., ad networks)
looking to obtain users’ personal data for delivering targeted ads. With the current practice of inserting ads into free apps, the process is quite simple – advertisers
provide prepackaged developer kits (e.g., iApp) that allows app-developers to get
revenue by including a few lines of code into their apps. The code not only displays
ads in the app, but also tunnels back data from the smartphones to the backend ad
networks.
10

Sensor Access. We assume that an adversary is able to collect raw sensor readings directly. Such an assumption is easy to satisfy, because among all smartphone
sensors, only the location sensor requires explicit user permission (on both Android
and the iPhone platforms). Other sensors (e.g., accelerometers and gyroscopes) can
be accessed without notifying users. Even if explicit permission is required in the
future to access sensors, the apps could be legitimately granted permission and the
adversary may inherit such a permission to launch an attack.
Packaged Sensors. Since it is difficult to replace the sensors inside a smartphone, we assume that throughout the operational lifetime of a smartphone, the
sensors on the smartphone are not replaced.

Attack Scenarios
Consider a health-conscious and commuting user (hereafter Bob) installing apps for
monitoring his daily activities and traffic conditions. All these apps rely on inertial
sensors (e.g., accelerometer, gyroscope) and could be loaded with ads supplied by
the same ad network. As a result, the ad networks can collect detailed data of Bob
along with Bob’s sensor readings/fingerprints. When the ad network observes Bob’s
sensor fingerprints for the first time, it creates a user profile that grows as more data
arrives from Bob (note that this profile may not include Bob’s name or any ID).
Even after Bob uninstalls all these apps, his fingerprint profile remains in the digital
world. Now, once Bob installs a new app with ads from the same ad network, the
ad network can now extract the sensor fingerprint, correlate with the past data, and
make strong inferences about Bob’s behavior.
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Chapter 4
AccelPrint Design
This section describes the 3 sub-modules of the overall system: (1) Accelerometer
data collection; (2) Fingerprint generation; (3) Fingerprint matching.

Accelerometer Data Collection
We define the accelerometer fingerprint as the response it yields to any predefined
motion stimulus. We found that the vibration motor internal to a smartphone –
mainly used to “buzz” the device – generates consistent motion stimuli, and can be
programmed to ON/OFF states at fine time scales. Hence, we collect accelerometer
data during time windows when the vibration motor is ON, and call this raw data
a trace. Of course, the vibration motor need not be explicitly turned on for trace
collection (or else a malware may raise the user’s suspicion due to frequent vibrations). Instead, the malware could opportunistically collect the accelerometer data
whenever the vibration motor is active, perhaps due to an incoming email, SMS,
phone-rings, or other alerts and push notifications.
A natural question is how can one detect when the vibration motor is active, given
that no standard Android API is available to check its ON/OFF status? AccelPrint
uses the accelerometer data itself to identify portions during which the vibration
motor was ON. This is feasible mainly due to 2 factors: First, the to-and-fro motion
generated by a vibration motor is faster than any normal human activity. Second,
12

based on our analysis on 6 types of Android devices (4 smartphones and 2 tablets),
the effect of a vibration motor is significantly higher on the Z-axis irrespective of the
device orientation. This is because a motor is typically mounted on the phone such
that it has greater movement freedom along the Z-axis. Leveraging this observation,
our detection algorithm calculates the derivatives of the acceleration in all 3 axes
and compares them against empirically designed thresholds. We tested our scheme
by turning on the vibration motor at random duty cycles (we used the “fastest”
sampling mode in Android). Figure 4.1 shows the results – the detection is reliable
across various user activities, including when driving a car, placed on a table top,
walking, running, etc.
Still

On Car

Walk

Run

Accl. Z axis
Actual Duty Cycle
Algo output

Figure 4.1: Identifying when the vibration motor is ON from the accelerometer
readings directly.
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Fingerprint Generation
Trace Pre-processing. Instead of extracting features from a raw trace, AccelPrint
pre-processes the trace to obtain two sets of intermediate data: one represents how
often an accelerometer reading was recorded and one represents the absolute value of
accelerometer readings. Let {sx (k), sy (k), sz (k)} be the kth acceleration along x, y,
and z axes, and T (k) be the timestamps. AccelPrint calculates sampling intervals
I(k) and the root sum square (RSS) of accelerometer readings S(k) as follows.




I(k) = T (k + 1) − T (k)
q



S(k) = s2x (k) + s2y (k) + s2z (k)

Since {sx (k), sy (k), sz (k)} are not sampled at a fixed interval, the derived values
{T (k), S(k)} are not equally-spaced. This makes the frequency domain characteristics difficult to compute. Hence, AccelPrint employs a cubic spline interpolation [35]
to construct new data points such that {T (k), S(k)} are now equally-spaced.
Feature Selection. We extract 40 scalar features in both time and frequency
domains using LibXtract [3], a popular feature extraction library. The time domain
features are calculated using {T (k), S(k)} prior to interpolation, and the frequency
domain features are drawn from the interpolated version. Since we consider features
for both S(k) and I(k) (where I(k) is the interval between samples), a total of 80
features are available for use. To select features, we ranked features using the FEAST
toolbox [6] and utilized the joint mutual information criterion for ranking (known to
be effective for small training data [12]). From the results, we select the top 8 time
domain features (see Table 4.1) and top 10 frequency domain features (see Table 4.2).
In total, 36 features are used to construct the fingerprint.
Formally, for a trace i, we denote F(I)i and F(S)i as the set of selected features
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Table 4.1: List of Time Domain Features. The vector x is the time domain representation of the data. N is the number of elements in x.
Feature Name

Description

Mean

x̄ =

1
N

N
P

x(i)

si=1
Std-Dev

1
N −1

σ=

N
P

(x(i) − x̄)2

i=1

Average Deviation

Dx̄ =

1
N

N
P

i=1
N

Skewness

γ=

1
N

β=

1
N

P
i=1
N

Kurtosis

P

si=1
RMS Amplitude

A=

1
N

|x(i) − x̄|
(x(i)−x̄) 3
σ



(x(i)−x̄) 4
σ



N
P

−3

(x(i))2

i=1

Lowest Value
Highest Value

L = (M in(x(i))|i=1 to N )
H = (M ax(x(i))|i=1 to N )

of I(k) and S(k), respectively. The fingerprint of this trace is then represented by
< F(I)i , F(S)i > .

Fingerprint Matching
AccelPrint uses supervised learning to classify smartphone accelerometers, beginning with a training phase followed by testing (or classification). During training, n
traces from a smartphone are collected for extracting fingerprints, and the n sets of
features < F(I)i , F(S)i >i∈[1,n] are used to train the classifier. For m smartphones,
n × m sets of features can be used to train the classifier all together. In addition,
given n set of features that constitute the fingerprint of a new smartphone, the classifier database can be updated to incorporate the new smartphone. We employ an
ensemble classification approach for training mainly to achieve robustness over any
single classification approach [10, 17, 33, 41]. Among various ensemble techniques
possible, we use Bagged Decision Trees [11] for ensemble learning.
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Table 4.2: List of Frequency Domain Features. The vector y is the frequency domain
representation of the data. Here vectors ym and yf hold the magnitude coefficients
and bin frequencies respectively. N is the number of elements in ym and yf .
Feature Name
Spec. Std Dev
Spec. Centroid
Spec. Skewness
Spec. Kurtosis

Description
s
σs =

N
P

Cs =

 Ni=1
P

γs =

 i=1
N
P

βs =

i=1
N
P

(yf

 . N
P

∗ ym (i)

(i))2


ym (i)

i=1

yf (i)ym (i)

 . N
P


ym (i)

i=1



(ym (i) − Cs )3 ∗ ym (i) /σs3



4

(ym (i) − Cs ) ∗ ym (i) /σs4 − 3

i=1

Spectral Crest

CRs = (M ax(ym (i))|i=1 to N ) /Cs

Irregularity-K

IKs =

N −1

P

ym (i) −

ym (i−1)+ym (i)+ym (i+1)
3

i=2
N −1

P
Irregularity-J

IJs =

(ym (i)−ym (i+1))2

i=1
N −1

P

(ym (i))2

i=1

N −1

Smoothness

Ss =

P

20.log(ym (i))−

i=2





20.log(ym (i−1))+20.log(ym (i))+20.log(ym (i+1))
3

Flatness
Roll Off

Fs =
Rs =

N
Q

ym (i)

 N1 . N
P

i=1
SampleRate
N





ym (i) /N

i=1

∗n P
n

ym <T hreshold

i=1

During the testing phase, AccelPrint collects a trace, extracts a set of features
< F(I), F(S) >, and inputs to the classifier. The classifier either outputs a positive
match with one of the phones that it has been trained with, or indicates an “alien”,
implying that this accelerometer is not from any of the phones used for training. In
such a case, AccelPrint initiates a training request that collects n traces from the
alien smartphone, inserts a new entry to the classifier database, and re-trains the
system. Although false negatives could occur, additional side-information could be
leveraged to exercise caution before re-training. For instance, enforcing the rule that
the classifier can be re-trained only when the trace is the first one collected by an
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app since installation, could improve the confidence in re-training.
To distinguish an alien device from the known devices, we apply a threshold on
the classification score – if the match is less than the threshold, then the trace is
declared “alien”. Figure 4.2 plots the classification scores for both alien and preregistered phones (the first half of the X-axis are traces drawn from alien devices,
and the vice versa). Observe that the alien phones generally present a relatively low
score and a threshold is not difficult to find to accomplish reliable segregation. In
AccelPrint, we have picked the threshold to be 0.6.

Classification Score

1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0

Alien Phones
Pre-registered Phones

0

20

40
60
Trace Number

80

100

Figure 4.2: The threshold for segregating alien phones can be chosen from a wide
range, indicating robustness.
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Chapter 5
Performance Evaluation
We have evaluated the performance of AccelPrint using 80 stand-alone accelerometer chips, 25 smartphones and 2 tablets. The key questions we investigated and the
corresponding findings are summarized below.
• How much training is needed to learn the fingerprint? We find that 30 seconds
of accelerometer trace is sufficient to model a device’s fingerprint.
• Does the fingerprint manifest only at the fastest sampling rate? No, even at
slower sampling rates, devices exhibit distinguishing features. However, the
performance is slightly better at faster rates.
• Does the system need to be aware of the surface on which a device is placed?
No. Whereas training on a variety of surfaces improves the performance, the
system itself is surface-agnostic.
• Can we mask the fingerprint of a device with a case? The fingerprints of a
device with and without a case are different. However, similar to surfaces, by
training with and without a case, a device can be classified with high precision.
• Is the system sensitive to CPU load? Somewhat. If the difference in CPU load
at the time of training and testing is less than 40%, it does not significantly
affect the performance of AccelPrint.
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We now begin by describing the experimental setup and the performance metrics
used for evaluation.

Experimental Setup
We have conducted experiments with 80 accelerometer chips of 3 types, 60 MPU6050, 10 ADXL-345, and 10 MMA-8425q. The setup used for experiments with
stand-alone chips is described earlier in Section 2. We have also experimented with
25 Android phones of 5 different models and 2 tablets: i) 8 Nexus One; ii) 7 Samsung
Galaxy Nexus; iii) 6 Samsung Galaxy S3 iv) 2 Nexus S; v) 1 HTC Incredible Two;
vi) 1 HTC MyTouch; and vii) 2 Samsung Galaxy Tab 2.
As it is difficult to gather large amounts of sensor readings in natural settings
from many users, we conducted experiments in our lab. The internal vibration
motor of smartphones is used to stimulate the accelerometer for 2 seconds and the
accelerometer readings are recorded with the sampling mode set to “Fastest” by
default. We refer to this 2 seconds of accelerometer data as trace. We collect 50
accelerometer traces for each of the 80 chips and 27 phones/tablets, a total of 5350
traces. Out of these traces, 30 from each device, i.e., a total of 3210 are used as the
testing set. The rest of the traces are used for training at different times depending
upon the training size. Once trained, we test the system with 30 traces from each
device and measure how well it performs in classifying those traces. Note that the
training and testing traces are non-overlapping.
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Figure 5.1: Overall performance: confusion matrix

Performance Metrics
Given an accelerometer trace, AccelPrint classifies it as belonging to one of the
devices for which it is trained for. Let k be the total number of devices or classes.
Then, based on the ground truth, for each class i, we define T Pi as the true positives
for class i, i.e., the number of traces that are correctly classified as i. Similarly, F Ni ,
and F Pi , respectively refer to the number of traces that are wrongly rejected, and
wrongly classified as i. Now, we can define the standard multi-class classification
metrics, precision, and recall, as follows.
precisioni =
recalli =

(T Pi )
(T Pi + F Pi )

(T Pi )
(T Pi + F Ni )

Then, we can compute the average precision and recall.
average precision =
average recall =
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Figure 5.2: Overall performance: (a) precision; (b) recall.

Overall Performance
As mentioned earlier, we trained the system with 15 traces and tested it with a different set of 30 traces from each of the 107 chips/phones/tablets. The resulting average
classification score for each device is shown on a heat map in Figure 5.1. In this plot,
the darker the shade, the higher the classification score. Evidently, the diagonal cells
are the darkest, implying that the traces from device i is indeed classified to class i.
While there are some gray non-diagonal cells, instances of misclassification are rare.
This is because the classifier picks the device with the maximum score, so long it is
greater than a threshold (used for segregating alien phones).
Zooming into the results, we compute the precisioni and recalli for each class i,
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and plot the CDF of their distributions in Figures 5.2a and 5.2b. Since the burden of
training is of interest in practical settings, we show the performance of AccelPrint
with varying number of training traces: 5, 10, and 15. Even with 5 training traces
(amounting to 10 seconds of training), both precision and recall are above 75% for
all classes. The tail for both precision and recall gets shortened as the training size
increases to 10, with none of the classes having precision below 85%. With training
size 15, the worst case precision improves to 87%, while the average precision and
recall are both above 99%. Since 30 seconds of training is not too burdensome (a
malware in a phone could silently collect data from, say, 30 incoming phone rings),
we fix the training size to 15 in the rest of the evaluation.
Next, we consider several factors that could affect our ability to model fingerprints
and classify devices. The rate at which an app samples the accelerometer readings
depends on the configured mode as well as the CPU load. The surface on which the
phone is placed may influence the vibration sensed by the accelerometer. In view
of operations in uncontrolled environments, we study the impact of these factors on
the fingerprint classification performance.

Significance of Sampling Rate
The Android OS allows four different sampling rates for the accelerometer. These
with decreasing order of rate are: i) Fastest; ii) Game; iii) UI; and iv) Normal. The
sampling rate of the Fastest mode on our devices varies from around 100 Hz to 20 Hz,
depending upon the hardware/software specification and the activity level. However,
the sampling rate of the Normal mode remains same for all the devices (around 4
Hz).
To study the effect of sampling rate on fingerprinting, we have conducted exper22

iments with each of the four modes. The results of these experiments are shown in
Figure 5.3. It is evident that the faster the sampling rate the higher the precision
and recall are. However, even at the slowest rate of Normal, precision and recall
are both above 80%. This indicates that with only 4 samples of accelerometer readings per second, different devices can be distinguished with reasonable amount of
precision. Of course, with larger number of samples per second, subtle differences
between accelerometers can be discerned with much higher precision.
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Figure 5.3: Performance with different sampling rates

Impact of CPU Load
To control the CPU load and measure its effect on AccelPrint, we create a background process using Android IntentService class. This service is kept awake for a
certain fraction of a second and made to sleep the rest of the time. Let us refer to
the percentage of time the background service remains awake as “load level”. To
measure the impact of load, we first train our system with 0 load level. Then we test
it with traces collected at four different levels (0%, 20%, 40% and 60%). Then, we
gradually increase the load level for training and test with traces collected at four
load levels.
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Figure 5.4 depicts the precision of AccelPrint in this scenario as a heat diagram,
i.e., the darker the region, the higher the precision. It is evident that whenever we
train and test the system with the traces collected at the same CPU load (diagonal
region), we achieve high precision, whereas if we keep increasing the load difference
between train and test cases then the precision starts to reduce. The reason is that
at higher loads, some of the accelerometer readings get skipped, yielding different
set of features. However, the precision is still above 80% when the load difference is
within 40%. Overall, these results show that when the difference in load at the time
of training and testing is not large, it does not significantly affect the performance
of AccelPrint.
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Figure 5.4: Precision with varying CPU loads

Impact of Smartphone Casing
People typically use cases for phones and hence it is pertinent to understand how
a smartphone having a case affects its accelerometer’s response to vibration. Commonly used cases are of two types: hard covers made of plastic and soft covers made
of rubber/leather. So, we have conducted experiments using both types of covers

24

and collected accelerometer readings of phones with and without those covers. The
results of the experiments are shown in the following figure.
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Figure 5.5: Performance with and without phone cases

When the training is done using the traces of phones without a case and then
testing is done with phones having a case, and vice versa, the classification performance is not high. Clearly, a phone’s case does influence its accelerometer’s response
to vibration. However, when the system is trained and tested with a case, having the
case did not affect the classification of a phone, yielding high precision and recall.
Furthermore, when the system is trained by a mix of traces with and without cases,
it performed almost as well. Considering that people do not change their phone’s
case often, its accelerometer’s fingerprint helps identify it even with a case.

Impact of Surface
The amount of stimulation generated by a smartphone’s vibration motor may depend upon the surface on which it is placed. To measure this effect, we collected
accelerometer readings, keeping each smartphone on four types of surfaces: wooden
table, carpeted floor, sofa cushion and on top of a palm. The system is trained
with traces from each surface and tested with traces from all surfaces. We have also
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trained the system with a mix of traces, equal number from each surface, and tested
again with all surface traces. The number of traces used for training is kept same in
all cases. The results of these experiment are shown in Figure 5.6.
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Figure 5.6: Performance with different surfaces

When the system is trained by placing the phones on a table and then tested by
placing them also on carpet, cushion, and hand, it classifies with an average precision
of around 80% and recall close to 60%. This is reasonable considering that compared
to table other surfaces like cushion absorb different amounts of vibration, and hence
accelerometer readings reveal different set of features. However, when we train the
system with a few traces from each surface, it can classify a given trace from any of
the surfaces with 98% precision and recall. Note that, it achieves this performance
without us having to explicitly indicate the surface while testing a trace. In other
words, AccelPrint is surface-agnostic.
To summarize, our evaluation using 107 different types of stand-alone chips,
smartphones, and tablets shows that they can be identified robustly leveraging the
fingerprints of their accelerometers. While even larger study is needed to confirm
the scalability of our findings, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to
attempt device identification based on fingerprints of accelerometers.
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Chapter 6
Related Work
Device Fingerprinting
Fingerprints are originally used as a biometrics technology to identify human beings [45, 49]. The concept was applied to device identification as early as in 1960s,
when a “specific emitter identification” system that utilizes externally observable
characteristics of signals was developed to distinguish radars [48]. Later, the similar
technology was used to identify transmitters in cellular networks [20, 31, 43]. Since
then, much effort has been devoted to identifying network devices by building a
fingerprint out of their software or hardware.
In terms of software-based fingerprint, MAC address was exploited to detect the
presence of multiple 802.11 devices. The combination of chipsets, firmware and device
drivers [24], or the patterns of wireless traffic [38] were also used to identify devices.
The downside of these software-based methods is that fingerprints will be different
once computer configuration or traffic behavior changes.
Hardware-based approaches rely on stabler fingerprints. Network devices have
different clock oscillators that create stable and constant clock skews [47], which
can be estimated remotely using TCP and ICMP timestamps for device fingerprinting [29]. Radio frequency (RF) fingerprinting has been extensively studied to identify wireless transmitters and can be divided into two categories: channel-based and
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device-based. Channel-based methods estimate the channel impulse response that
characterizes multipath effect [40] and attenuation [23,54] between a transmitter and
a receiver for RF fingerprinting. Device-based methods rely on the distinct radiometrics of transmitters at the waveform [25–27, 32, 44, 50] or modulation [51] levels.
Wired Ethernet NICs can also be identified by analyzing their analog signals [42].
Our work is inspired by the aforementioned device fingerprinting work. Instead
of wireless or wired transmitters, we focus on fingerprinting smartphones utilizing
the imperfections of on-board sensors.

Privacy and Side Channel
Sensor-rich smartphones and tablets are increasingly becoming the target of attacks
for harvesting sensitive data [19]. Enck et al. [21, 22] showed the potential misuse of
users’ private information through third-party applications, and Schlegel et al. [46]
demonstrated that a smartphone’s microphone can be used maliciously to retrieve
sensitive data.
Since Cai et al. pointed out that smartphones built-in sensors (e.g., GPS, microphone and camera) can be used as a side channel to record user actions by stealthily
sniffing on them [15], several systems (e.g., TouchLogger [13], ACCessory [37], Taplogger [53]) have been built. They have shown that collecting data from an accelerometer or a gyroscope alone is enough to infer the sequences of touches on a soft
keyboard. Cai et al. [14] compared gyroscopes and accelerometers as a side channel
for inferring numeric and soft-keyboard inputs. They found that inference based on
the gyroscope is more accurate than the accelerometer. Milluzo et al. went one step
ahead to develop TapPrint [36] that uses gyroscopic and accelerometer reading in
combination to infer the location of tapping on tablet and smatphone keyboards.
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In addition, it was shown that accelerometer readings can be used to infer not only
PINs but also Android’s graphical password patterns [9].
Inferring keystrokes on a regular keyboard has attracted much attention. Electromagnetic waves [52], acoustic signals [55], timing events [30], and specialized software [28] were exploited to intercept the keystrokes with high accuracy. It is also
possible to infer keystrokes using the accelerometer readings from an iPhone placed
two inches away from the keyboard.
Instead of treating sensors as a side channel, we focus on the built-in fingerprint
of a smartphone for device identification.
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Chapter 7
Limitations and Discussion
(1) Scalability. Accelerometer fingerprints may not need to be globally unique
to pose a threat. For instance, if a smartphone accelerometer in the US proves
to be identical to another in Taiwan, the backend adversary may still be able to
disambiguate using the device’s cell tower location. Put differently, broad location,
device type, and other contextual factors can relax the stringency on uniqueness.
Moreover, combining additional sensors within the fingerprint, such as the gyroscope
and the microphone, can further increase the ability to discriminate. From crude
measurements, we have observed that the gyroscope also responds to stimuli from
the phone’s vibration motor. For the microphone, it may be feasible to play a fixed
audio file through the speakers, and the recording processed for the fingerprint.
(2) Scrubbing the Fingerprint. In an attempt to scrub the fingerprint, we first
attempted to compute the resting acceleration of each device, i.e., the acceleration
value when the phone is completely at rest on a pre-defined location. Given that the
resting values are different across phones, we equalized the RSS values by suitably
adding or subtracting from the signal. Still, the fingerprinting accuracy did not
degrade since the uniqueness probably arose from a wide range of features. Equalizing
across all these features is certainly difficult. Alternatively, we added 0dB white
Gaussian noise to the signal, but observed only a marginal drop in precision and
recall (to 93%). Upon adding 5dB of noise, the performance dropped sharply, but
30

other higher level operations were also affected severely. Finally, we used a low
pass filter to eliminate the high-frequency components of the signal, but again was
not able to remove the fingerprint without affecting the application. We opine that
fingerprint scrubbing requires closer investigation, and will be a critical next step to
AccelPrint.
(3) Influence of Operating Systems We have used the Android operating
system (ice cream sandwich and gingerbread) for all the smartphones. Between all
phones using the identical OS version, the fingerprints are still discernible, implying
that AccelPrint is not affected by the operating system.
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Conclusion
At the core of an accelerometer, a electro mechanical moving part holds the key to
sensing. The manufacturing of such moving parts are susceptible to imperfections,
bringing about diversity in the behavior of accelerometers. This diversity is not conspicuous from a higher level since various operations such as step-counts and display
rotations are tolerant to noise. However, when the properties of these imperfections
are deliberately extracted, they lead to a sensor fingerprint, adequate to identify a
device, and even an user. Our results offer confidence that such fingerprints exist,
and are visible even in real, uncontrolled environments. While commercial-grade
measurements are necessary towards a conclusive result, we believe that our lab
findings are still an early and important step for understanding sensor fingerprints
and their consequences at large.
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